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 Chapter 12 
 Water Governance Futures in South Asia 
and Southern Africa: Déjà Vu All Over 
Again? 
 Douglas  J.  Merrey ,  Anjal  Prakash ,  Larry  Swatuk ,  Inga  Jacobs , 
and  Vishal  Narain 
 Abstract  This chapter explores the likely trends and outcomes in water gover-
nance by about 2030 in two regions: South Asia and Southern Africa. It addresses 
the question: What are the prospects for developing governance arrangements in the 
two regions that will lead to more positive outcomes in terms of sustainably improv-
ing people’s livelihoods while conserving natural resources? It examines this ques-
tion through three “lenses”: (1) “beyond disciplines”, (2) “beyond scales” and (3) 
“beyond ‘institutional’ hardware to ‘human’ software”. The two regions are cur-
rently on different trajectories: the Southern African trajectory seems to be moving 
in a positive direction, in contrast with South Asia. The chapter discusses four fac-
tors that go far to explaining this divergence: (1) the contrasting roles of the hege-
monic countries, (2) the level of intercountry “trust” that has emerged in the two 
regions, (3) the roles of civil society and NGOs and (4) the roles of external facilita-
tors. The chapter emphasises the importance of developing the human software – 
the “soft skills” of communication and shared values complementing technical 
competence – as the most critical driver of successful water resource governance. 
 D. J.  Merrey (*) 
 Independent Consultant ,  Gainesville ,  FL ,  USA 
 e-mail: dougmerrey@gmail.com 
 A.  Prakash 
 International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) ,  Kathmandu ,  Nepal 
 e-mail: anjal.prakash@icimod.org 
 L.  Swatuk 
 University of Waterloo ,  Waterloo ,  ON ,  Canada 
 e-mail: lswatuk@uwaterloo.co 
 I.  Jacobs 
 Council for Scientifi c and Industrial Research (CSIR) ,  Pretoria ,  South Africa 
 e-mail: ingajacobs30@gmail.com 
 V.  Narain 
 Management Development Institute (MDI) ,  Gurgaon ,  India 
 e-mail: vishalnarain@mdi.ac.in 
230
 Keywords  South Asia •  Southern Africa •  Water governance •  Transnational river 
basins •  Problemsheds 
12.1  Introduction 
 In the waning years of the past century and the early years of this twenty-fi rst cen-
tury, there have been predictions that competition for increasingly scarce water sup-
plies will lead to famines, the breakdown of stressed societies, confl icts and even 
warfare among countries. Serious disagreements and threats are emerging over 
development of water resources. Water scarcity in North Africa and the Middle East 
threatens food security and economic growth 1 . Upstream countries on the Nile 
Basin want to replace water-sharing rules imposed by the colonial powers with new 
rules they deem more equitable – creating alarm and consternation in downstream 
countries for whom the Nile waters is critical (Swatuk  2012 ). In addition, the inter-
national consensus and drive behind the integrated water resource management 
(IWRM) paradigm is now fraying. IWRM has been the basis for considerable prog-
ress in increasing scientifi c knowledge and understanding of water resource issues, 
sharing this knowledge widely among stakeholders and building networks and insti-
tutions for managing water effectively (see, e.g.  www.cap-net.org ); but it has inhib-
ited investments, especially in underdeveloped river basins such as those in Africa 
(e.g. Giordano and Shah  2014 ). 
 On the other hand, partly as a result of the IWRM movement, there are important 
signs that sharing water resources can trigger cooperation among countries (Wirkus 
 2005 ). The idea of sharing the benefi ts of water resource development rather than 
seeking formulas for equitable sharing of the water resource itself offers an oppor-
tunity to achieve a higher net benefi t – but this requires a high degree of trust among 
the parties (Grey and Sadoff  2007 ; Sadoff and Grey  2002 ). This principle of “benefi t 
sharing” is the basis for the Nile Basin Initiative, the Mekong Commission and the 
SADC Protocol on water sharing, among others (Earle et al.  2010 ). Achieving a 
high level of trust and creating effective institutional arrangements to produce and 
share the benefi ts equitably is fundamentally an issue of water governance. This is 
proving extremely diffi cult to achieve. The decade of progress made in achieving 
cooperation among most of the Mekong countries is threatened by unilateral invest-
ments in dams by some upstream countries eager to achieve more rapid economic 
growth (Burton  2011 ; Grumbine et al.  2012 ; Houba et al.  2013 ). The progress made 
by the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is threatened by disagreements over the funda-
mental rules for sharing water resources and by upstream countries hungry for rapid 
hydroelectric and agricultural development. 
1  See, e.g.  http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID = 47181#.Uw9h-aOYbIU (accessed 23 
April 2014). 
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 The water sector does not exist in isolation: for instance, the understanding of the 
water-energy-food-climate change nexus has grown recently (Bizikova et al.  2013 ; 
WEF  2011 ). This refl ects a growing recognition that the challenges posed within 
each of these “sectors” (for want of a better term) interact in complex and dynamic 
ways with the others. Further, governance and management arrangements for the 
water sectors are embedded in larger political and institutional contexts. Mobilising 
water for agricultural production and using it productively, particularly on rain-fed 
fi elds, will be critical for achieving future food security. However, mobilising water 
for hydroelectric and other uses is also critical in many regions – and both compete 
with the use of water for agriculture and support agricultural water by reducing 
energy costs of pumping. Climate change is affecting all major river basins in ways 
that are complex and not easily predicted. Making water available for drinking and 
household uses, ensuring adequate water fl ows for environmental services and 
improving the productivity of fi sheries are other critical challenges. 
 Given these interlinkages and interdependencies, what will water governance 
look like in the future? By “future” we mean approximately 2030, on the premise 
that crystal balls and forecasting models become totally opaque beyond a 15-year 
horizon. Defi ning “governance” is diffi cult: there are multiple competing formula-
tions. For the purpose of this chapter, we defi ne governance as referring to “all 
processes of governing [i.e. managing affairs], whether undertaken by a govern-
ment, market, or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organisa-
tion, or territory, and whether through laws, norms, power, or language”. It relates 
to processes and decisions that seek to defi ne actions, grant power and verify perfor-
mance (Bevir  2013 : 1). Most of those writings about “water governance” use the 
defi nition of the Global Water Partnership: “the range of political, social, economic 
and administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, 
and delivery of water services, at different levels of society” (Rogers and Hall  2003 ). 
Governance thus refers to the institutional systems and process through which deci-
sions are made and implemented. It constitutes the processes through which control 
and authority are exercised in the allocation of water resources. 
 This chapter explores the likely trends and outcomes in water governance with a 
particular focus on cooperation and confl ict over the management of water resources 
in two regions: South Asia and Southern Africa. In South Asia, the focus is on the 
governance of three very large-scale shared river basins, the Indus, Ganges and 
Brahmaputra, inhabited by nearly a billion mostly poor people. The Ganges and 
Indus basins are under growing stress in the context of a lack of appropriate water 
governance arrangements. South Asia has struggled to fi nd ways to co-manage 
water resources to benefi t everyone equitably in a context where there is much 
potential benefi t to be achieved. Southern Africa is considered an example of rela-
tive success in developing ways to cooperate – but implementation is incredibly 
complex in systems that are smaller in terms of size and population but more water 
scarce than the South Asian basins. So the critical question is:  what are the pros-
pects for developing governance arrangements in the two regions that will lead to 
more positive outcomes in terms of sustainably improving people’s livelihoods 
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while conserving natural resources than achieved so far versus further deteriora-
tion and rising confl ict? 
 We examine this question through three “lenses” which we characterise as 
“beyond disciplines”, “beyond scales” and “beyond ‘institutional’ hardware to 
‘human’ software”.  Beyond disciplines addresses the question of how to mobilise 
the diverse types of expertise productively to solve problems. It is based on the rec-
ognition that no single discipline is suffi cient to address the emerging challenges of 
water resource governance and management. Addressing the governance challenges 
facing the water sector requires a diverse range of scientifi c expertise combined 
with a wide spectrum of actors – represented by the state, civil society and the pri-
vate sector. Further, no amount of technical and scientifi c ingenuity is adequate if 
the solutions generated are not relevant to the specifi c socio-political and socio- 
economic contexts in which they are applied (Jacobs  2012 ). 
 Beyond scales examines how to defi ne the “space” for transboundary water 
resource governance and management. Traditionally, there has been a tendency to 
prioritise the hydrological basin as the primary unit of analysis in water governance 
and its management. Recently, this notion has been broadened to include other 
socio-political and socio-economic communities with a stake in the resources: 
thinking has evolved from the watershed to the “problemshed” to the virtual and 
social basin (Mollinga et al.  2007 ). There is therefore a changing defi nition of inter-
national river basins – encompassing not hydrological boundaries alone but “lived 
in” social spaces, i.e. the sum of social practices and discourses that exist within the 
biophysical space. 
 The third lens,  beyond institutional hardware to human software , enables us to 
examine the entry points to bring about a shift from institutional systems that favour 
the powerful at the expense of others, to more enlightened leadership and gover-
nance arrangements that can help achieve both greater social equity and environ-
mental sustainability. The main focus of interventions, based on disciplines such as 
foreign relations, policy sciences and institutional economics, has been on engineer-
ing structural changes in institutions that change incentives and therefore behaviour 
and outcomes (North  1995 ). This emphasis may have led to a failure to recognise 
the equally critical importance of individuals’ mindsets and “soft skills” in bringing 
about change: while training and capacity building has emphasised enhanced tech-
nical skills, less attention has gone to how to enable individuals to champion and 
lead in intangible areas like building trust and fostering norms that guide behaviour 
in more productive ways. This is not an either-or choice; rather it is a matter of get-
ting the balance right between building institutions and fostering the soft skills 
needed to make them work. 
 The next two sections discuss the water governance challenges and opportunities 
facing South Asia and Southern Africa. Section  12.4 draws on the discussion in 
these sections and tries to assess the prospects for alternative futures and their impli-
cations for the well-being of the people. The concluding section briefl y character-
ises the wider implications of these cases. 
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12.2  South Asia: A Glass (More Than) Half Empty? 
12.2.1  The Emerging Water Governance Context 
 Water governance in South Asia has changed dramatically in recent decades. The 
gap between governance and “government” has widened (Mathur  2009 ) as other 
actors have acquired stronger roles in the allocation of water resources. The locus of 
water policy-making has moved from the state to include other actors: partly through 
the dynamic of (formal and informal) markets, the private sector and civil society 
have created greater space for themselves (Narain et al. ( 2014 )). State authority has 
been diluted at all levels. On the one hand, donors and funders play an increasing 
role in infl uencing the direction and nature of reforms; on the other hand, civil soci-
ety organisations have also infl uenced water governance. 
 New discourses such as those of IWRM and neo-liberalism have penetrated the 
water sector. However, the regional relevance of the IWRM paradigm has been 
questioned, given both the apparent mismatch between the informal nature of the 
water economy and the emphasis on formal organisational structures envisaged 
under IWRM reforms and the lack of political edge in the way IWRM has been 
conceptualised (Kulkarni  2014 ; Mollinga et al.  2006 ; Shah and Van Koppen  2006 ). 
The neo-liberal paradigm has been criticised for its exclusion of the poor (Urs and 
Whittel  2009 ). The discourse on gender mainstreaming has gained prominence, 
even as the gap between rhetoric and practice has persisted (Kulkarni  2014 ; Joshi 
 2014 ; Ahmed  2008 ; Prakash et al.  2012 ). 
 During the 1980s and 1990s, disenchantment with the role of the state in the 
management of the region’s massive surface irrigation schemes led to demands for 
a greater involvement of users in irrigation management. In South Asia, this process 
is referred to as “participatory irrigation management” (PIM). However, several fac-
tors limited the effectiveness of the process, including limited attention to issues of 
design and technology in the handover of irrigation systems, reproduction of 
unequal power relations in the internal working of water users’ associations, limited 
attention to questions of rights and entitlements and powerful resistance within the 
bureaucracy (Narain  2008 ; Jairath  1999 ; Parthasarathy  1998 ). The debate on appro-
priate approaches to arrest groundwater depletion has continued, with “competitive 
deepening” identifi ed as a major issue in some locations and climate change being 
recognised as another stressor, compounding the effects of groundwater depletion 
(Shah  2009 ,  2013 ). Falling water tables are seen as a serious threat to food security 
(Saleth  1996 ; Shah  2009 ,  2013 ). 
 South Asian water resource scholarship has thus recently experienced an upsurge 
(Mollinga  2008 ). Multiple voices are emerging in the water discourse; it is therefore 
necessary to create a space for dialogue among government, civil society and citi-
zens (Lahiri-Dutt  2008 ; Narain et al. ( 2014 )). In examining the opportunities for 
improved water governance and management, two scales are important: the grow-
ing potential for confl icts and cooperation across rural and urban uses and trans-
boundary water confl icts, each of which is discussed below. 
12 Water Governance Futures in South Asia and Southern Africa: Déjà Vu All Over…
234
12.2.2  Rural–Urban Water Confl icts 
 Most of the rapidly growing South Asia cities have expanded by acquiring the land 
and water resources of peripheral regions, creating vast peri-urban zones (Narain 
et al.  2013 ). Since urban expansion is a gradual process of acquiring land and water 
from the peripheral regions, it has equity implications for those living at the periph-
ery of large cities, as it raises questions for their land and water security. The usurpa-
tion of peri-urban water sources in South Asian countries has taken many forms 
(Narain et al.  2013 ). First, there are physical fl ows of water from the peri-urban to 
urban locations, for instance, through water tankers or the construction of canals to 
divert water from rural to urban uses. Second is the acquisition of village common 
property water sources to build urban infrastructure. Third is the encroachment 
upon the village commons. The fourth is the pollution of peri-urban water sources 
by urban and industrial waste. 
 Several policy and institutional issues are responsible for this phenomenon. The 
fi rst is the linking of land and water rights. When access to water is tied to owner-
ship of land, the process of land acquisition that characterises urban expansion leads 
to loss of access to water sources as well (Narain  2014 ). The second is the frag-
mented nature of urban planning and rural development that presents rural and 
urban water supply as distinct planning entities. Urban planners and policy-makers 
focus on the expansion of urban water infrastructure, overlooking its implications 
for rural water security. There is growing confl ict around peri-urban water sources – 
both freshwater and wastewater (Gopakumar  2012 ; Narain  2014 ). The absence of 
appropriate forums or platforms for the integration of urban planning and rural 
development creates opportunities for confl icts over water, but there are also oppor-
tunities for cooperation. As urbanisation advances, the demand for platforms for 
negotiation and confl ict resolution across rural and urban water supplies will become 
more visible. 
 An important water governance challenge in the region in the coming years will, 
therefore, be to develop appropriate institutions to integrate water supply provisions 
for urban and rural uses. This could take various forms: the evolution of multiple 
stakeholder platforms across rural and urban uses and the evolution of platforms to 
bring peri-urban residents face to face in dialogue with service providers. Current 
and on-going research in the region is expected to throw new light on opportunities 
for reducing confl ict and encouraging cooperation in the management of peri-urban 
water insecurity. 
12.2.3  Confl ict and Cooperation in Transboundary Water 
Resource Management 
 The major transboundary rivers in South Asia are the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra. 
These rivers originate in the Hindu-Kush Himalayan region and are connected to the 
Tibet Autonomous Region of China. The Indus Basin connects Afghanistan, China, 
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India and Pakistan. Approximately 300 million people live in the Indus Basin, 
which covers an estimated area of 1.12 million km 2 . The Indus is critical to the sur-
vival of Pakistan, one of the driest countries in the world (Briscoe et al.  2005 ). The 
huge Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna (GBM) Basin system stretches across fi ve 
countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India and Nepal (Ahmad et al. ( 2001 )). 
While Bangladesh and India share all three basins, China shares only the 
Brahmaputra and Ganges, Nepal only the Ganges and Bhutan only the Brahmaputra. 
Nepal is located entirely in the Ganges Basin and Bhutan entirely in the Brahmaputra 
(Salehin et al.  2011 ). It is estimated that at least 630 million people live in the GBM 
river basin (Aquastat  2011 ) (see Fig.  12.1 ).
 Worldwide, studies have shown that in modern times, no wars have as yet been 
fought over water and over 145 water-related treaties have been signed on trans-
boundary rivers (Wolf  1998 ). Nevertheless, confl ict over water at local levels is 
common and the potential for interstate confl ict over water is real 2 . In South Asia, 
numerous challenges exist to managing the three major transboundary rivers 
(Prakash et al. ( 2013 )). These challenges can broadly be divided into two, namely, 
biophysical and socio-political. On the biophysical side, Lutz and Immerzeel ( 2013 ) 
summarise the challenges in terms of cryospheric response to a changing climate in 
the Hindu-Kush Himalayan region. In essence, they conclude that the Indus runoff 
may change somewhat by 2050 (though the direction of change is uncertain), but 
the GBM runoff will not show major changes. 
2  See:  http://pacinst.org/issues/water-and-confl ict/ and  http://www2.worldwater.org/confl ict/time-
line/ (accessed 8 September 2015). 
 Fig. 12.1  Map of the Indus, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers in South Asia ( Source: Lutz 
and Immerzeel  2013 ) 
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 The real challenges lie in the socio-political arena where confl icts are brewing. 
The Indus Water Treaty has often been held as a showcase where the two signato-
ries, India and Pakistan, had gone through two wars, but the Treaty has functioned 
reasonably well (Biswas  1992 ). This notion recently came into question when 
Pakistan objected to India’s Kishanganga project; Pakistan decided to go straight to 
arbitration without considering the other options available under the Indus Water 
Treaty (Chintan  2011 ). This issue illustrates the diffi culties with static water trea-
ties, since conditions change over time and the countries concerned fi nd that treaties 
become increasingly out of tune with the new conditions (Biswas  2011 ). Salehin 
et al. ( 2011 ) document the status of cooperation in the GBM basin. They conclude 
that the lack of mutual trust and confi dence among the co-riparian countries has 
played a major role in the long-standing disputes or confl icts surrounding trans-
boundary rivers. 
 A lack of trust between the countries combined with the absence of a shared 
vision has led to a pattern of non-cooperation in the region. As Biswas ( 2011 : 669) 
notes, “This pernicious mind-set has eroded goodwill and confi dence, and has gen-
erated mutual mistrust and suspicion. The situation is further compounded by the 
failure of the political leaders to create public opinion in favour of formulating and 
implementing a vision for regional cooperation and development”. Studies on trans-
boundary water confl ict and cooperation generally consider interstate relations over 
shared water resources without also considering intrastate relations. International 
water confl ict and cooperation may be infl uenced by domestic politics and vice 
versa (Giordano et al.  2002 ). For example, the failure of India and Bangladesh to 
reach an agreement on the proposed Teesta River Treaty in 2012 was a result of 
opposition by the state government of West Bengal. 
 The major problem lies in the lack of understanding or acceptance of mutual 
benefi ts in co-management of transboundary rivers. Sharing of water is based on 
parties who give and take water and therefore is largely understood a win-lose game. 
Promoting peaceful cooperation for environmental management, benefi t-sharing 
and sustainable use of transboundary freshwater resources is possible only if inno-
vative approaches are used that bring together all sectors and actors whose actions 
affect the transboundary water body at regional, national and local levels (Earle 
et al.  2010 ). The development of a science-based diagnostic analysis is essential to 
identify the threats to the transboundary ecosystem and to break down the issues 
into manageable parts with the aim of developing a strategic action programme. The 
sharing of benefi ts from water use – whether from hydropower, agriculture, fl ood 
control, navigation, trade, tourism or the preservation of healthy aquatic ecosys-
tems – is immense and therefore a mindset shift is needed. 
12.2.4  The Future of Water Governance in South Asia 
 The gap between the potential benefi ts of cooperating to develop and manage shared 
water resources and the reality of continuing poverty, food insecurity, energy inse-
curity and resource degradation is immense and growing. We offer a few suggested 
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changes in governance arrangements that could lead to a more positive outcome by 
2030. 
 First, the “space” for regional water management must be redefi ned. Discussions 
and agreements on river water (or benefi t) sharing must move from being bilateral 
to being multilateral: to date, most of the diplomatic initiatives on river water shar-
ing have been bilateral in nature. Multilateral discussions, including recognition of 
local competition for equitable access to water, could reduce the dominance of any 
single state leading to more equitable and legitimate agreements. Second, South 
Asian governance arrangements need to adopt a “co-management” and “benefi t- 
sharing” perspective, rather than only sharing water. There is a dire need for co- 
management of transboundary rivers for mutual benefi t, especially as climate 
change and human interventions affect water fl ows. This will require a more diverse 
range of expertise and inclusion of a wider set of actors to succeed. Third, hydro-
power and the creation of an integrated South Asian power grid offer a game- 
changing opportunity for regional prosperity and peaceful coexistence. The 
cooperation between Bhutan and India demonstrates the potential for such an inte-
grated approach. Achieving such regional win-win partnerships by 2030 will be 
diffi cult but is not impossible. Achieving this game-changing state of affairs will 
require mobilising diverse types of expertise and facilitating the active engagement 
of multiple actors (“beyond disciplines”); changing mindsets from a hydrological to 
a problemshed paradigm (“beyond scales”); and implementing effective institu-
tional arrangements while – most important – strengthening capacities for negotia-
tion, dialogue and communication as well as technical skills and identifying 
effective champions with a regional vision (“beyond institutional hardware to 
human software”). Organisations operate in the manner they do as a result the 
behaviour of people who work within them (Senge et al.  2008 ). These steps will 
need to be accompanied by a process to create the institutional frameworks critical 
for long-term success. 
12.3  Southern Africa: A Glass Half Full? 
12.3.1  The Regional Context 
 Water resources are highly varied across Southern Africa. The region receives most 
of its water during the wet summer season (October to April), when rain arrives 
from the Indian Ocean. The majority of this water falls within 400 km of the east 
coast of the continent. In general, the region is better watered in the north and east 
and much drier in the south and west, except along the southern coasts of South 
Africa. According to Conley ( 1996 : 17), “the Zambezi River carries more than ten 
times as much water, and the Zaire [Congo] River carries more than a hundred times 
as much water, as the Orange River in the south”. In addition, the region is prone to 
both drought and fl ood, sometimes occurring simultaneously (Chenje and Johnson 
 1996 : 2). While it is often said that Southern Africa is “water scarce”, it should be 
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noted that scarcity is driven primarily by human and economic factors more than it 
is in terms any “water endowment”. As shown in Fig.  12.2 , there are at least 15 
international watercourses in the SADC region (Swatuk  2002 ; Ashton  2002 ) 3 .
 No community, country or region anywhere in the world began with effective 
water governance. Governance structures evolve over time as a consequence of 
need and as a reaction to a set of conditions relative to water in social relations. 
Their institutionalisation emerges over time. Rare is the institution that emerges 
fully blown; rather, what we see is the gradual build-up of a governance system over 
time. Even where new states are created, such as South Sudan, with new  institutional 
arrangements, these will be infused with the pre-existing social norms, practices 
3  Ashton and Turton ( 2009 ) identify 21 basins. This is a debate we do not pursue here. 
 Fig. 12.2  Transboundary River Basins of SADC ( Source:  http://www.limpoporak.com/en/river/
geography/basins+of+southern+africa.aspx ) 
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and expectations that cannot be erased, but which may not be adequately acknowl-
edged in a state-building process. Thus, as Dovers ( 2001 ) points out, institutions 
better refl ect the past than anticipate the future. Given their histories, “[i]nstitutions 
are both barriers to and opportunities for ecologically sustainable human develop-
ment. Institutions can pervert or empower human potential” (Dovers  2001 : 215). 
Path dependency is real. 
12.3.2  Evolution of Regional Water Governance 
 It has been more than 20 years since the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) became the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). With regard to water resource governance and management, SADC mem-
ber states have been engaged in signifi cant institution building, at national and 
regional levels, over the past two decades. All member states have or have expressed 
their intention to revise their water laws, to reform their governance arrangements 
and to create new water management organisations. Most have attempted to bring 
their national laws, policies and procedures into line with fellow member states, all 
of which are informed by the Revised SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses 
(referred to as the “SADC Protocol” from here on), and dominant global discourses 
concerning integrated water resource management, water integrity and water effi -
ciency, to name only three of the many conceptual infl uences active in the region. 
These initiatives are supported by a seemingly never-ending fl ow of people, fi nance, 
technology and ideas from Europe and elsewhere in the world. It is a rather grand 
experiment with uneven results (Swatuk and Fatch  2013 ). 
 These mixed results are understandable. This is especially so when one considers 
the failure to factor into plans, policies and programmes the historical basis and 
contemporary manifestation of the politics of water resource access and use in post- 
colonial/post-apartheid Southern Africa. Put differently, Southern Africa comprises 
a set of unevenly developed states where access to water and land refl ects profound 
socio-economic inequalities. To shy away from these facts is to guarantee poor 
water governance. Thus, to say that a triple-E (social equity, economic effi ciency, 
environmental sustainability) bottom line is the aim of national/regional water gov-
ernance is simply not enough (SADC  2011 ,  2012 ). The region must move beyond 
high-minded platitudes to improve practices and achieve better outcomes. This 
requires asking diffi cult questions regarding the relationship between existing gov-
ernance structures and management practices and their role in, and relationship to, 
abiding conditions of widespread poverty and unequal access to and economically 
and environmentally unsustainable use of water. As with South Asia, demographic 
drivers – urban population growth, abiding rural poverty – and extensively shared 
international waters should concentrate the minds of decision-makers, particularly 
under the speculative cloud of the negative impacts of climate change. 
 Many good things have happened over the past two decades. The legal basis is 
mostly in place regarding fair and equitable use of the region’s resources, both 
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within states and among them. Most of the region’s shared basins have some sort of 
governing architecture in place. At the centre of regional cooperation is the SADC 
Protocol, without which many of the joint fact-fi nding and knowledge-building 
exercises in the region’s basins may not have been possible. Dramatic changes in 
South Africa’s political landscape since the early 1990s were initially accompanied 
by sweeping changes to that nation’s policies, laws and institutions. South Africa 
became a very active member of SADC, leading processes around issue areas such 
as devising national water policies, strategies and laws. South Africa’s water reform 
spurred the wave of reforms experienced in neighbouring countries post-1990 as 
well. 
 However, like many developing countries, SADC states struggle with imple-
menting many of their well-formed policies, laws and procedures. There are a wide 
variety of explanations regarding this relatively poor performance: human, fi nancial 
and technological shortages, “poor governance” embedded in unequal states, ten-
sions around the creation of new sources of authority such as catchment manage-
ment agencies or councils and water user associations, resource capture facilitated 
by neoliberal approaches to resource management and persistent global economic 
crises forcing resource-extracting economies to “stick to what they know”. Some 
critics have argued that rather than introduce a whole new set of structures, state 
actors should have worked with existing, already legitimate, forms of authority. Van 
Koppen et al. ( 2014 ) suggest that the nationalisation of water resources and the 
introduction of formal permit systems, while probably important in principle (par-
ticularly in highly unequal societies), have in fact facilitated further resource cap-
ture by the empowered and the undermining of local systems of governance. 
 Yet there are success stories: Namibia’s basin management committees, particu-
larly in the western-draining ephemeral Kuiseb river basin, show the real potential 
for ideal-typical IWRM-style systems to emerge (Manning and Seely  2005 ). Indeed, 
the role of Rand Water, South Africa’s largest water services provider in the Greater 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Area, suggests that public-private partnerships can 
work given a particular set of parameters 4 . In the transboundary context, states have 
shown a willingness to cooperate, though not quite extending to striking what Litfi n 
( 1997 ) describes as “sovereignty bargains”, such as those that typify the European 
Union. New modalities of decision-making have been successfully introduced; 
numerous multidisciplinary, transnational research and knowledge-generating proj-
ects and programmes are underway; and the important 14-year-old regional water 
research and education programme, WaterNet 5 , has been building the region’s pro-
fessional capacity. WaterNet is recognised as the water capacity-building arm of 
SADC, and its implementation through a set of regional universities and training 
institutions has promoted mutual understanding – even friendships – among regional 
water professionals. To be sure, some of these activities are being pushed by exter-
nal actors, whose absence would quite possibly threaten the negotiation and bar-
gaining processes. Much of this feels like one step forward, one step backward, yet 
4  Rand Water is a government-owned entity that operates autonomously, largely like a private fi rm. 
5  http://www.waternetonline.org/ (accessed 8 September 2015). 
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if we are to realise the imagined sustainable water resource governance future of the 
region, it is important to see the glass as half full. 
12.3.3  How to Fill a Glass that Is Half Full 
 A sustainable water governance future will require a fi rm technical and legal/insti-
tutional foundation, i.e. institutional hardware. But having adequate amounts of 
money, physical infrastructure (pipes and so on) and the right systems of delivery 
and oversight will only go so far in the absence of what we are calling “appropriate 
human software”. In our view, one key element is leadership – at all levels. Even 
those who have advocated for the role of institutions above individuals have con-
ceded, as noted for South Asia, that the behaviour of individuals within organisa-
tions determines the outcomes. Indeed, the importance of individuals to the success 
or failure of effective water governance is under-researched despite being critically 
important (Kranz and Jacobs  2012 ). The role of the individual in relation to skills 
audits and occupational profi les needed for effective water management has been 
analysed in several disciplinary-specifi c analyses, particularly in education science. 
However, these have centred on human resource assessments of technical qualifi ca-
tions and their alignment with professional job descriptions in water and wastewater 
treatment. More research needs to be conducted on the role of the individual in 
actively addressing complex water-related challenges, in redefi ning how multiple 
sectors cooperate around these issues, and ultimately infl uencing socio-economic 
development at the regional level. 
 Part of the problem with water governance in the SADC and indeed SAARC 
regions is that political and economic power confers water security as a right upon 
the offi ce holder or private actor, and subsequently, those whom they deem worthy. 
In the days leading up to the end of colonial/apartheid rule and for several years 
thereafter, leaders in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa took decisions as if time 
was short and the needs of all citizens mattered. These countries are now many 
years into “independence” and the urgency – as well as most of the leaders – has 
evaporated. In the cases of Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique, a fundamental 
problem is that there has been little or no turnover at the top of the ladder, draining 
the life out of the system, particularly at the lowest levels of authority. Where will 
the vision and drive come from when the need for change is least apparent to those 
ostensibly responsible for the task? 
 One way to accelerate development from a water perspective is to train leaders 
that can speak different (technically specifi c) languages and who can convey and 
convince a critical mass of the appropriateness of a particular intervention. This 
speaks both to the role and need for individuals who are able to adopt a broader and 
more holistic mindset. But it may also include the identifi cation of particular occu-
pational or personality profi les for transboundary managers and policy-makers who 
are more predisposed to operate in this socially constructed landscape. 
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 To build the necessary human software and to inhabit the existing institutional 
hardware, education matters. Present and future generations of leaders must be 
made to see that water is not an ordinary good (Savenije  2002 ). Since water infuses 
all things and is fundamental to the functioning of all elements of society, it must be 
mainstreamed throughout the region’s information and educational systems. What 
should be avoided is the “crisis narrative” – though to be sure, there is a crisis and it 
is felt primarily by the poor – and what should be showcased is how everyone is 
downstream. Put differently, poor and misguided behaviour will eventually come 
back to haunt you. No matter how insulated political and economic leaders and their 
families feel, they are only one tweet away from ending up like Egypt’s Hosni 
Mubarak. The growing number and seriousness of social protests around water sup-
ply delivery in South Africa, which has also become an important political issue, is 
an indicator of the danger. 
 Trust – social capital – also matters. Good governance depends upon state-civil 
society relations wherein state action acts as a feedback loop to civil society expec-
tations. Every opportunity must be taken to draw political leaders into activities 
where political involvement is necessary to facilitate project or programme success. 
For example, in Botswana, President Ian Khama’s role as patron of the Kalahari 
Conservation Society ensures environmental issues a place of importance at the 
highest levels of decision-making. Of course, such interactions should also acknowl-
edge the existence of power relations, i.e. how individuals interact with each other 
and absorb information. If one actor is perceived to be powerful, other people in the 
conversation may feel too intimidated to speak. This dynamic needs to be carefully 
managed to foster fruitful dialogue. This point is particularly relevant for policy- 
makers operating at the regional level who have to contend with different levels of 
power purely as a result of where they come from, i.e. with some countries being 
more able to infl uence policy decisions because of socio-economic clout, military 
hegemony, human capacity and/or infl uential alliance. Where progressive systems 
are already in place, such as much of the SADC region, leadership and ethics must 
be one focus for fi lling a half-fi lled glass. 
 At the 2012 International Freshwater Conference, a question was asked in ple-
nary on whether the push for basin-scale governance structures wasn’t a mistake 
and that perhaps it made more sense to work from existing structures and imbue 
them with a “river basin sensibility”. The panel, comprising senior government offi -
cials and former members of the water administration, was uniformly in agreement: 
the basin is the way forward. If this is the case, then perhaps we can approach the 
question in the opposite way: with a river basin governance framework in place, is 
it not important to (i) embed this level of authority within existing levels of authority 
in meaningful ways and (ii) imbue the river basin authority with a sense that water 
itself is highly fl uid, moving in and out of the basin in a variety of forms (e.g. as 
virtual water) impacting a wide variety of actors, themselves external to the basin? 
What we are suggesting is a type of governance framework that emerges through a 
process Cleaver ( 2002 ,  2012 ) describes as  bricolage : building on existing structures 
rather than creating new ones that may be regarded as a threat to existing authorities 
(Jonker et al.  2010 ; Merrey and Cook  2012 ). It has been suggested that river basin 
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governance would be more effective if the higher level institutions incorporated 
basic values and processes characterising local indigenous governance (Merrey 
 2009 ). In any event, it is clear that the new basin management regimes within states 
have stalled for this very reason. Future water governance will have to be fl exible 
enough to draw in participants when needed; this will be a kind of networked gov-
ernance not solely dependent upon the physical geography of the river basin. 
 Lastly, we wish to highlight the value and importance of moving beyond the 
water sector and beyond the pride of place held by physical/environmental scien-
tists: engineers, hydrogeologists, biochemists and so on. Some years ago, Turton 
et al. ( 2007 ) described the importance of the government-science-society “trial-
ogue”. Sustainable, equitable and effi cient water governance will also require 
unpacking “science” to ensure that political, social and even philosophical/ethical 
dimensions are adequately captured. Most water problems are self-infl icted: they 
result from human interventions into natural processes, affecting the hydrological 
cycle among other ecosystem dynamics. People as groups and individuals are 
affected differently and therefore regard particular outcomes of these activities very 
differently. Decisions regarding use and management therefore are imbued with 
normative, ethical and subjective considerations. The questions asked, the problems 
addressed and the “experts” drawn upon refl ect the particular constellations of 
forces that exist within a society at any one time (Swatuk  2010 ). It is imperative, 
therefore, that future water governance arrangements make adequate space for con-
tested ideas and interests and the ways and means of accommodating these without 
violence. Many of the necessary elements are in place in the SADC region. The 
challenge, then, is to fi ll the glass, not draw down the fl uid that is already there. 
12.4  Conclusion: Prospective Futures of Water Resource 
Management 
 At present, governance structures, organised nationally and transnationally on a 
basin scale in both regions, presume that “stakeholders” can adequately represent 
themselves in formal settings where allocation, use and management decisions are 
taken. This is problematic in at least three ways. The fi rst is where rural areas are 
divided in terms of large-scale, cash crop producers and small-scale producers 
(Southern Africa) or in terms of wealthy expanding urban centres and small-scale 
producers (South Asia). The former are few but economically and politically power-
ful. The latter are many, but poorly empowered, especially where water and land 
allocation and use decisions are concerned. The former commandeer the vast major-
ity of blue water for irrigation or urban and industrial uses. The latter farm the worst 
land and depend heavily on the green water fl ow deriving directly from rainfall. The 
second is in urban areas divided between the rich few and the many poor. The for-
mer have in-house provision “on tap” and are able to supplement shortages in many 
ways. The latter often depend on on-plot or communal standpipes that may not be 
working or working only intermittently. The former have access to water-borne 
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sewerage systems that are well serviced. The latter make do with an array of often 
quite alarming “options”. Where resource-poor municipalities are forced to make 
choices, they have opted for privatising systems of delivery which too often rein-
force the existing inequalities, delivering too little of poor quality to the urban poor. 
And the third is that dominant narratives and framing concepts such as “climate 
change-induced scarcity” and “closed basins”, to name but two, reinforce path 
dependencies, as the “haves” aim to hold onto what they have and to extend their 
water “rights” where possible (e.g. with large farmers shifting into “biofuels” as a 
means of extending holdings and profi ts). Taken together, if left unattended, these 
three factors will not only reinforce social inequity, economic ineffi ciency and eco-
logical unsustainability; they also heighten the likelihood of confl ict among “stake-
holders” at a wide variety of scales: within the state, within the city, across the 
countryside and across state borders. 
 In other important ways, especially at the transnational level, South Asian and 
Southern African water governance arrangements are on what seem to be different 
trajectories. In South Asia, the governance glass is not only half empty but is not 
fi lling up. In Southern Africa, the governance glass is half full and there are pros-
pects – though no guarantee – it will be fuller by 2030. Both regions have a regional 
association to promote cooperative development, the South Asia Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and SADC. However, the SAARC website ( http://
saarc-sec.org/ 6 ) does not refer to cooperation in management of water resources, 
while SADC has provided a forum for its members to agree on governance arrange-
ments for shared water resources. In addition to the SADC Protocol, there are 
regional water strategies and plans as well as increasingly effective joint commis-
sions for managing each of the major shared river basins. Both regions are domi-
nated by countries with a British colonial past (though SADC has two Lusophone 
countries). While it is true that SADC’s scale in terms of area and population 
(approximately 250 million) is a fraction of South Asia’s, SADC does have more 
member countries (15); and although the river basins are smaller, there are more of 
them and most are “closed” – there is no more water to be allocated. Scale alone 
cannot explain their contrasting trajectories. 
 While more work would be needed for a full analysis of the roots of their differ-
ences, we suggest that their different histories – and not scale or ecology – explain 
their divergence. Here we discuss four factors: (1) the contrasting roles of the hege-
monic power, (2) the different levels of “trust”, (3) the roles of civil society and 
other NGOs and (4) the roles of external facilitators. 
 Until the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, South Africa was at odds politically 
with most of its neighbours and regional countries. It did strike bilateral agreements 
for management or development of specifi c river basins, using its overwhelming 
power to ensure it got a good deal. After 1994, South Africa adopted a policy of 
collaboration with other countries in the region. It plays a critical role in driving the 
process of increasing regional partnerships through SADC in a wide variety of sec-
tors, not only water. SADC can be seen as an example of expansion from a narrow 
6  Accessed 8 September 2015. 
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river basin focus to a broader shared social basin or “problemshed” perspective. 
Nevertheless, we cannot push this point too far: concerns about South Africa’s 
intentions have been one factor retarding the development of the Limpopo 
Watercourse Commission (LIMCOM). South Africa is not a riparian on the largest 
regional basins, the Congo and Zambezi, where cooperation remains problematic; 
however, it does have a strong interest in expanding their hydroelectric potential. 7 
Agreements on how best to manage the Zambezi water resources will be a defi ning 
factor for regional development by 2030 (Swain et al.  2011 ). 
 In South Asia, the long-standing confl ict between India and Pakistan overshad-
ows all efforts to promote regional cooperation. In addition, India has never tried to 
play the role of the “benign hegemon” that South Africa deliberately tries to play; 
its role is more analogous to that of apartheid South Africa. India fi nds it diffi cult to 
share data and to support efforts to create governance structures that would enable 
shared development and management of water resources for mutual benefi ts. These 
differing roles may in part be a product of how local (i.e. within-country) water 
issues affect transboundary cooperation in South Africa and India. In India, states 
have considerable constitutional and political power over water development – and 
the country has struggled to resolve interstate confl icts. As the Teesta river case 
shows, Indian states can even veto international agreements. This cannot happen in 
South Africa: water resources are constitutionally and politically a central govern-
ment subject; and the provinces are relatively weak entities. A critical determinant 
of the shape of water resource management by 2030 will be India’s role. 
 Related to this contrast in the role of the hegemon is the question of trust. Given 
the long history of apartheid in Southern Africa, it may seem surprising that the 
level of intercountry trust is higher than in South Asia. This is not universal – 
Mozambique is wary of the actions of its upstream neighbour South Africa, for 
example. Nevertheless, the seemingly interminable workshops and meetings at 
multiple levels, many facilitated by the regional Global Water Partnerships (GWP), 
have contributed greatly to creating a large degree of mutual understanding and 
strong personal relationships among civil servants, water professionals and civil 
society members 8 . Another major contributing factor is the role of WaterNet, a net-
work of over 65 universities and training and research institutions with capacities in 
water management training and research. Through its professional interdisciplinary 
M.Sc. course, regional professionals spend time in other regional countries and 
develop strong personal ties as they work and study together; and regional institu-
tions develop strong professional partnerships. The net result of the many regional 
workshops and joint training and research programmes is a cadre of professionals 
that combine “soft” skills with professional competence, linked into an effective 
personal network. These activities rest on a shared history of resistance to colonial 
rule and apartheid oppression. Put differently, the long history of warfare in the 
7  There are also speculative plans to divert Zambezi water south to South Africa, though this seems 
unlikely to happen. 
8  These are incidentally found at the highest level as well, as the leaders of some of the countries in 
the region had strongly supported the African National Congress when it was fi ghting apartheid. 
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region has helped strengthen interstate relations – an important foundation for fac-
ing shared current (e.g. drought/fl ood) and future (e.g. climate change-induced 
hydrological extreme variability) challenges. South Asia’s history is quite 
different. 
 In South Asia, long-standing unresolved confl icts continue to dominate. Pakistan 
was carved from the eastern and western wings of British India in bloodshed; 
Bangladesh was created in a bloody civil war that involved India; and India is con-
cerned about the infl uence of China on its neighbours. SAARC remains a weak 
entity, unable to overcome the mutual suspicions characterising relationships among 
the member countries. Civil society initiatives such as the SaciWATERS (South 
Asia Consortium for Interdisciplinary Water Resources Studies) initiative called 
“Crossing Boundaries” have brought some researchers in South Asian universities 
together. However, there are far fewer regional workshops and meetings (including 
World Bank’s South Asia Water Initiative) than in Southern Africa – in part because 
of travel restrictions between Pakistan and India. The regional GWP is less effective 
than in Southern Africa; it lacks the convening power GWP-Southern Africa has 
earned. There is no equivalent of WaterNet. 
 This leads to the third signifi cant factor: the roles of civil society organisations 
and regional NGOs. While within South Asian countries (especially India, 
Bangladesh and Nepal) civil society organisations have strong voices in the water 
sector, there are no effective NGOs working on South Asian regional water issues 
outside the GWP, and its convening power is weak. In Southern Africa, there are a 
number of regional NGOs with strong convening power. Examples include not only 
GWP-Southern Africa, but also the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy 
Analysis Network (FANRPAN). These organisations have teamed up, for example, 
on the Limpopo Basin and have also drawn in some of the key national NGOs and 
civil society organisations. 
 Finally, the fourth factor is the role of outside facilitators – especially donors. In 
Southern Africa, a number of European donors have played key roles not only in 
facilitating communication and agreements but in fi nancing their implementation. 
This applies as well to WaterNet, FANRPAN and GWP. Indeed, these donors are so 
critical that they seem to have created a dependency on outside funding. If they 
 suddenly withdrew, it is not clear how sustainable the regional water governance 
institutions would be. Nevertheless, without their support Southern Africa would 
not have reached its current level of cooperation and partnership, which importantly 
includes streamlining water-specifi c legal and institutional frameworks across the 
region, as well as building local and national capacity for such things as improved 
urban water supply, rural (economic and household) water provision and environ-
mental management. 
 Donors have to date not been able to play such a signifi cant facilitating role in 
South Asia, perhaps in part because of Indian resistance. We argue that in regions 
with long histories of confl ict, having such an outside facilitator cum fi nancier in the 
initial stages is crucial. The Nile and Mekong river basins are cases in point. 
 However, in addition to creating dependency, the donors may have retarded 
infrastructural development in Southern Africa. The donors have at times made 
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IWRM an end in itself, at the expense of implementing practical solutions (Giordano 
and Shah  2014 ). With their emphasis on environmental conservation and high levels 
of consultation with all stakeholders – driven by internal constituencies – they have 
been reluctant to fi nance major infrastructural development in the water sector 
beyond local water-supply systems. 
 Will the water resource glasses be fuller by 2030 than they are now? Both regions 
could benefi t from regional cooperation based on sharing the benefi ts of water 
resource development, for example, through regional electricity networks. The 
prospects seem good in Southern Africa, if the countries can move from talking to 
investing and creating a more integrated regional economy based in part on shared 
management of water resources. The potential is great but prospects are less rosy in 
South Asia: there are growing challenges internally in providing water and power 
services. These could be addressed through effective regional cooperation. But 
without stronger regional networks, partnerships and institutions supported by 
external facilitators, South Asia may fail to take full advantage if its water resources 
to achieve better lives for its people by 2030. 
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